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What’s Advertising Content Worth?









Firms spend billions of dollars each year advertising consumer products in order to influence
demand. Much of these outlays are on the creative design of advertising content. Creative
content often uses nuances of presentation and framing that have large effects on consumer
decision making in laboratory studies. But there is little field evidence on the effect of
advertising content as it compares in magnitude to the effect of price. We analyze a direct mail
field experiment in South Africa implemented by a consumer lender that randomized creative
content and loan price simultaneously. We find that content has significant effects on demand.
There is also some evidence that the magnitude of content sensitivity is large relative to price
sensitivity. However, it was difficult to predict which particular types of content would
significantly impact demand. This fits with a central premise of psychology— context matters—
and highlights the importance of testing the robustness of laboratory findings in the field.
JEL codes: D01, M31, M37, C93, D12, D14, D21, D81, D91, O12
Other keywords: economics of advertising, economics & psychology, behavioral economics,
cues, microfinance 
I. Introduction  
Firms spend billions of dollars each year advertising consumer products in order to influence 
demand. Economic theories of advertising often emphasize the role of informational content.  
Stigler (1987, p. 243), for example, writes that “advertising may be defined as the provision of 
information about the availability and quality of a commodity.” But advertisers spend resources 
on other components of content which do not appear to be informative in the Stiglerian sense.
1  
While laboratory studies in marketing have shown that non-informative, persuasive content 
may affect demand, there is little systematic evidence on the magnitude of these effects in the 
field. Instead existing field research has focused on advertising exposure and intensity, rather than 
on content: only 5 of the 232 empirical papers cited in Bagwell’s (2007) extensive review of the 
economics of advertising address advertising content effects. Bagwell’s review covers both 
laboratory and field studies and cites only one randomized field experiment.
2 Chandy et al (2001) 
review evidence of advertisement effects on consumer behavior, and find “research to date can be 
broadly classified into two streams: laboratory studies of the effects of ad cues on cognition, 
affect or intentions and econometric observational field studies of the effects of advertising 
intensity on purchase behavior… each has focused on different variables and operated largely in 
isolation of the other” (p. 399).
3 Hence, while sophisticated firms use randomized experiments to 
optimize their advertising content strategy (Stone and Jacobs 2001; Day 2003; Agarwal and 
Ambrose 2007), academic researchers have rarely used field experiments to study content effects. 
This dearth of field evidence on advertising content effects is striking given that the psychology 
and behavioral economics literature is full of lab and field evidence suggesting that frames and 
cues can affect consumer decisions.
4  
A particularly important gap is the lack of evidence on the magnitude of content effects 
relative to price. This comparison can be accomplished by simultaneously varying content and 
price in the same setting. A large marketing literature using conjoint analysis does this 
comparison, but is focused on controlled laboratory settings. Likewise, the existing field evidence 
on the effects of framing and cues does not simultaneously vary price. 
                                                 
1 E.g., see Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (forthcoming) for evidence on the prevalence of 
persuasive content in mutual fund advertisements.  
2 Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985) estimate how the intensity of advertising exposure affects the price 
sensitivity of self-reported demand of an unnamed consumer product, using a split-cable TV experiment. 
3 Simester (2004) laments the “striking absence” of randomized field experimentation in the marketing 
literature. Several other articles in the marketing literature call for greater reliance on field studies more 
generally: Stewart (1992), Wells (1993), Cook and Kover (1997), and Winer (1999). Similarly, in 
economics Levitt and List (2007) discuss the importance of validating lab findings in the field. 
4 See DellaVigna (2007) for a review of the field evidence and particularly influential laboratory studies.  
He does not cite any studies on advertising other than an earlier version of our paper. 
2 
Our study fills these gaps by analyzing a field experiment in South Africa. A subprime 
consumer lender randomized both the advertising content and interest rate in actual direct mail 
offers to 53,000 former clients (Figures 1-5 show example mailers).
5 This design enables us to 
estimate demand sensitivity to advertising content and compare it directly to price sensitivity. The 
variation in advertising content comes from eight randomized creative “features” that varied the 
presentation of the loan offer. We worked together with the Lender to design the features with 
reference to the extensive literature (primarily from laboratory experiments in psychology and 
decision sciences) on how “frames” and “cues” may affect choices. Mailers randomly varied in 
whether they included: a photograph on the letter, reference to the interest rate as special or low, 
suggestions for how to use the loan proceeds, a large or small table of example loans, inclusion of 
the interest rate as well as the monthly payments, a comparison to a competitors’ interest rate, 
mention of speaking the local African language, and mention of a promotional raffle prize for a 
cell phone. 
Joint F-tests across all eight content randomizations identify whether advertising content 
affects demand. We find significant effects on loan take-up (the extensive margin) but not on loan 
amount (the intensive margin). We do not find any evidence that the extensive margin demand 
increase is driven by reductions in the likelihood of borrowing from other lenders. Nor do we find 
evidence of adverse selection on the demand response to advertising content: repayment default is 
not significantly correlated with advertising content. 
The experimental design also allows us to estimate how much marketing content influences 
behavior  relative  to the magnitude of the price effect. As one would expect, demand is 
significantly decreasing in price; e.g., each 100 basis point (13%) reduction in the interest rate 
increased loan take-up by 0.3 percentage points (4%). A few of the marketing content effects are 
large relative to this price effect. For example, showing a single example loan (instead of four 
example loans) had the same estimated effect as a 200 basis point reduction in the interest rate. 
We also use F-tests to bound the magnitude of the joint effect of the eight content treatments on 
loan takeup. We do this by identifying the smallest and largest absolute values that cannot be 
rejected under a null hypothesis. This exercise produces a wide range of content effect sizes that 
range from very small to very large relative to the price effect. 
Overall then we find some evidence that advertising content affects consumer demand, and 
some evidence that these effects can be large relative to price effects.  
We suggest that advertising content effects in our context operate through persuasion rather 
than information. Information-based explanations of our findings are challenged by two factors: 
                                                 
5 Customer and employee contact names are suppressed in these examples to preserve confidentiality. 
3 
(i) the sample population consists of customers with substantial prior and recent experience with 
the Lender, and (ii) the results suggest that some particularly effective content treatments provide 
less information (by displaying fewer example loan calculations or suggested loan uses). 
Our estimated magnitudes are particularly interesting in light of the interpretation that 
advertising content can be persuasive. These magnitudes suggest that traditional demand 
estimation which focuses on price (without observing the persuasive content) may produce 
unstable estimates of demand. A related sobering finding is that we generally failed to predict 
(based on the prior laboratory evidence) which particular types of advertising content would 
significantly impact demand. One interpretation of this failure is that we lacked the statistical 
power to identify anything other than economically large effects of any single content treatment. 
Another interpretation fits with a central premise of psychology— context matters— and 
highlights the importance of testing the robustness of laboratory findings in the field. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  Section II describes the market and our cooperating Lender. 
Section III details the experimental and empirical strategy. Section IV provides a conceptual 
framework for interpreting the results. Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II. The Market Setting  
A. Overview 
Our cooperating consumer Lender operated for over 20 years as one of the largest, most 
profitable lenders in South Africa.
6 The Lender competed in a “cash loan” market segment that 
offers small, high-interest, short-term, uncollateralized credit with fixed monthly repayment 
schedules to the working poor population. Aggregate outstanding loans in the cash loan market 
segment equal about 38 percent of non-mortgage consumer debt.
7 Estimates of the proportion of 
the South African working-age population currently borrowing in the cash loan market range 
from below 5 percent to around 10 percent.
8 
 
                                                 
6 The Lender was merged into a bank holding company in 2005 and no longer exists as a distinct entity. 
7 Cash loan disbursements totaled approximately 2.6% of all household consumption and 4% of all 
household debt outstanding in 2005.  (Sources: reports by the Department of Trade and Industry, Micro 
Finance Regulatory Council, and South African Reserve Bank). 
8 Sources: reports by Finscope South Africa, and the Micro Finance Regulatory Council.  We were unable 
to find data on the income or consumption of a representative sample of cash loan borrowers in the 
population. We do observe income in our sample of cash loan borrowers; if our borrowers are 
representative then cash loan borrowers account for about 11% of aggregate annual income in South 
Africa. 
4 
B. Additional Details on Market Participants, Products, and Regulation 
Cash loan borrowers generally lack the credit history and/or collateralizable wealth needed to 
borrow from traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks. Data on how borrowers 
use the loans is scarce, since lenders usually follow the “no questions asked” policy common to 
consumption loan markets. The available data suggest a range of consumption smoothing and 
investment uses, including food, clothing, transportation, education, housing, and paying off other 
debt.
9 
Cash loan sizes tend to be small relative to the fixed costs of underwriting and monitoring 
them, but substantial relative to a typical borrower’s income.  For example, the Lender’s median 
loan size of 1000 Rand ($150) was 32 percent of its median borrower’s gross monthly income 
(US$1 ~=7 Rand during our experiment).  Cash lenders focusing on the highest-risk market 
segment typically make one-month maturity loans at 30 percent interest per month.  Informal 
sector moneylenders charge 30-100 percent per month.  Lenders targeting lower risk segments 
charge as little as 3 percent per month, and offer longer maturities (12+ months).
10   
Our cooperating Lender’s product offerings were somewhat differentiated from competitors.  
It had a “medium-maturity” product niche, with a 90 percent concentration of 4-month loans 
(Table 1), and longer loan terms of 6, 12 and 18 months available to long-term clients with good 
repayment records.
11  Most other cash lenders focus on 1-month or 12+-month loans.  The 
Lender’s standard 4-month rates, absent this experiment, ranged from 7.75 percent to 11.75 
percent per month depending on assessed credit risk, with 75 percent of clients in the high risk 
(11.75 percent) category.  These are “add-on” rates, where interest is charged upfront over the 
original principal balance, rather than over the declining balance.  The implied annual percentage 
rate (APR) of the modal loan is about 200 percent.  The Lender did not pursue collection or 
collateralization strategies such as direct debit from paychecks, or physically keeping bank books 
                                                 
9 Sources: data of questionable quality from this experiment (from a survey administered to a sample of 
borrowers following finalization of the loan contract); household survey data from other studies on 
different samples of cash loan market borrowers (FinScope 2004; Karlan and Zinman 2008).    
10 There is essentially no difference between these nominal rates and corresponding real rates.  For instance, 
South African inflation was 10.2% per year from March 2002-2003, and 0.4% per year from March 2003-
March 2004. 
11 Market research conducted by the Lender, where employees or contractors posing as prospective 
applicants collected information from potential competitors on the range of loan terms offered, confirmed 
this niche. These exercises turned up only one other firm offering a “medium-maturity” at a comparable 
price (3-month at 10.19%), and this firm (unlike our Lender) required documentation of a bank account.  
ECI Africa and IRIS (2005) finds a lack of competition in the cash loan market. We have some credit 
bureau data on individual borrowing from other formal sector lenders (to go along with our administrative 
data on borrowing from the Lender) that we consider below. 
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and ATM cards of clients, as is the policy of some other lenders in this market.  The Lender’s 
pricing was transparent, with no surcharges, application fees, or insurance premiums. 
Per standard practice in the cash loan market, the Lender’s underwriting and transactions 
were almost always conducted in person, in one of over 100 branches. Its risk assessment 
technology combined centralized credit scoring with decentralized loan officer discretion. 
Rejection was common for new applicants (50 percent) but less so for clients who had repaid 
successfully in the past (14 percent). Reasons for rejection include inability to document steady 
wage employment, suspicion of fraud, credit rating, and excessive debt burden.   
Borrowers had several incentives to repay despite facing high interest rates. Carrots included 
decreasing prices and increasing future loan sizes following good repayment behavior. Sticks 
included reporting to credit bureaus, frequent phone calls from collection agents, court summons, 
and wage garnishments. Repeat borrowers had default rates of about 15 percent, and first-time 
borrowers defaulted twice as often. 
Policymakers and regulators encouraged the development of the cash loan market as a less 
expensive substitute for traditional “informal sector” moneylenders. Since deregulation of the 
usury ceiling in 1992 cash lenders have been regulated by the Micro Finance Regulatory Council 
(MFRC).
12 Regulation required that monthly repayment could not exceed a certain proportion of 
monthly income, but no interest rate ceilings existed at the time of this experiment. 
 
III.  Experimental Design, Implementation, and Empirical Strategy 
A. Overview 
We identify and price the effects of advertising content using randomly and independently 
assigned variation in the description and price of loan offers presented in direct mailers.
13 
The Lender sent direct mail solicitations to 53,194 former clients offering each a new loan at 
a randomly assigned interest rate. The offers were presented with variations on eight randomly 
assigned advertising content “creative features” detailed below and summarized in Table 2. These 
features varied only the presentation of the offer, not its economic content (i.e., not the cost, 
amount or maturity of available credit). 
                                                 
12 The “traditional” microfinance approach of delivering credit to targeted groups, often using group 
liability and not-for-profit mechanisms, is not prevalent in South Africa (Porteous 2003). But the industrial 
organization of microcredit is trending steadily in the direction of the for-profit, more competitive delivery 
of individual credit that characterizes the cash loan market (Robinson 2001).  This push is happening both 
from the bottom-up (non-profits converting to for-profits) as well as from the top-down (for-profits 
expanding into traditional microcredit segments). 
13 Mail delivery is generally reliable and quick in South Africa. Two percent of the mailers in our sample 
frame were returned as undeliverable. 
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B. Identification and Power 
We estimate the impact of creative features on client choice using empirical tests of the following 
form: 
(1)  Yi = f(ri, ci
1, ci
2, … ci
13, di, Xi)  
where Y is a measure of client i’s loan demand or repayment behavior, r is the client’s randomly 
assigned interest rate, and c
1…. c
13 are categorical variables in the vector Ci of randomly assigned 
variations on the eight different creative features displayed (or not) on the client’s mailer (we 
need 13 categorical variables to capture the eight features because several of the features were 
categorical, not binary). Most interest rate offers were discounted relative to standard rates, and 
hence clients were given a randomly assigned deadline di for taking up the offer. All 
randomizations were assigned independently, and hence are orthogonal to each other by 
construction, after controlling for the vector of randomization conditions Xi. 
We ignore interaction terms given that we did not have any strong priors on the existence or 
magnitude of interaction effects across treatments. In the sub-sections E-G below we motivate 
and detail our treatment design and priors on the main effects. 
Our inference is based on several different statistics obtained from estimating equation (1). 
Let β
r be the probit marginal effect or OLS coefficient for r, and β
1…. β
13 be the marginal effects 
or OLS coefficients on the creative variables from the same specification. We estimate whether 
creative affects demand by testing whether the β
n’s are jointly different from zero. We estimate 
the magnitude of creative content effects in two ways.  First we scale each β
n by the price effect 
β
r.  One can also scale the overall content vector effect, β
C, by the price effect after calculating 
the lower and upper bounds of the range of absolute values for which the joint F-test fails to reject 
with a p-value of 0.10. 
Our sample of 53,194 offers was constrained by the size of the Lender’s pool of former 
clients and is sufficient to identify only economically large effects of individual pieces of creative 
content on demand. To see this, note that each 100 basis point reduction in r (which represents a 
13% reduction relative to the sample mean interest rate of 793 basis points) increased the client’s 
application likelihood by 3/10 of a percentage point. The Lender’s standard take-up rate 
following mailers to inactive former clients was 0.07. Standard power calculations show that 
identifying a content feature effect that was equivalent to the effect of a 100 basis point price 
reduction (i.e., that increased take-up from 0.07 to 0.073) would require over 300,000 
observations. So in fact we can only distinguish individual content effects from zero if they are 
7 
equivalent to a price reduction of 200 to 300 basis points (i.e., to a price reduction of 25% to 
38%).  
 
C. Sample Frame Characteristics 
The sample frame consisted entirely of experienced clients. Each of the 53,194 solicited clients 
had borrowed from the Lender within 24 months of the mailing date, but not within the previous 
6 months.
14 The mean (median) number of prior loans from the Lender was 4 (3). The mean and 
median time elapsed since the most recent loan from the Lender was 10 months. Table 1 presents 
additional descriptive statistics on the sample frame. 
These clients had received mail and advertising solicitations from the Lender in the past. The 
Lender sent monthly statements to clients and periodic reminder letters to former clients who had 
not borrowed recently. But prior to our experiment none of the solicitations had varied interest 
rates or systematically varied creative content. 
 
D. Measuring Demand and Other Outcomes 
Clients revealed their demand with their take-up decision; i.e., by whether they applied before 
their deadline at their local branch. Loan applications were assessed and processed using the 
Lender’s normal procedures. Clients were not required to bring the mailer with them when 
applying, and branch personnel were trained and monitored to ignore the mailers. To facilitate 
this, each client’s randomly assigned interest rate was hard-coded ex-ante into the computer 
system the Lender used to process applications. 
Alternative measures of demand include obtaining a loan and the amount borrowed. The 
solicitations were “pre-approved” based on the client’s prior record with the Lender, and hence 
87% of applications resulted in a loan.
15 Rejections were due to changes in work status, ease of 
contact, or other indebtedness. The client also chose a loan amount and maturity (4, 6, or 12 
months) subject to the maximums offered by the branch manager. The maximums were 
orthogonal to the interest rate and content randomizations by construction, as branch personnel 
were instructed to ignore the mailer and underwrite maximum allowable debt service with respect 
to the standard interest rate schedule for a client’s risk category. 
                                                 
14 This sample is slightly smaller than the samples analyzed in two companion papers because a subset of 
mailers did not include the advertising content treatments. See Appendix 1 of Karlan and Zinman 
(forthcoming) for details. 
15 All approved clients actually took a loan; this is not surprising given the short application process (45 
minutes or less), the favorable interest rates offered in the experiment (see III-E for details), and the clients’ 
prior experience and hence familiarity with the Lender. 
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We consider two other outcomes. We measure outside borrowing, using credit bureau data. 
We also examine loan repayment behavior by setting Y = 1 if the account was in default (i.e., in 
collection or had been charged off as of the latest date for which had repayment data), and = 0 
otherwise. The motivating question is whether any demand response to creative content produces 
adverse selection by attracting clients who are induced to take a loan they cannot afford. Note that 
we have less power for this than for our demand estimations, since we only observe repayment 
behavior for the 4,000 or so individuals that obtained a loan. 
 
E. Interest Rate Variation 
The interest rate randomization was stratified by the client’s pre-approved risk category because 
risk determined the loan price under standard operations. The standard schedule for four-month 
loans was: low-risk = 7.75 percent per month; medium-risk = 9.75 percent; high-risk = 11.75 
percent. The randomization program established a target distribution of interest rates for 4-month 
loans in each risk category and then randomly assigned each individual to a rate based on the 
target distribution for her category.
16,17 Rates varied from 3.25 percent per month to 11.75 percent 
per month, and the target distribution varied slightly across two “waves” (bunched for operational 
reasons) mailed September 29-30 and October 29-31, 2003. At the Lender’s request, 97 percent 
of the offers were at lower-than-standard rates, with an average discount of 3.1 percentage points 
on the monthly rate (the average rate on prior loans was 11.0 percent). The remaining offers in 
this sample were at the standard rates. 
 
F. Mailer Design  
Figures 1-5 show example mailers. The Lender designed the mailers in consultation with both its 
marketing consulting firm and us. As noted above the Lender had mailed solicitations to former 
                                                 
16 Rates on other maturities in these data were set with a fixed spread from the offer rate conditional on 
risk, so we focus exclusively on the 4-month rate.  
17 Actually three rates were assigned to each client, an “offer rate” (r) included in the direct mail 
solicitation and noted above, a “contract rate” (r
c) that was weakly less than the offer rate and revealed only 
after the borrower had accepted the solicitation and applied for a loan, and a dynamic repayment incentive 
(D) that extended preferential contract rates for up to one year, conditional on good repayment 
performance, and was revealed only after all other loan terms had been finalized. This multi-tiered interest 
rate randomization was designed to identify specific information asymmetries (Karlan and Zinman 2007).  
40% of clients received r
c < r, and 47% obtained D=1. Since D and the contract rate were surprises to the 
client, and hence did not affect the decision to borrow, we exclude them from most analysis in this paper 
and restrict the loan size sample frame to the 31,231 clients who were assigned r = r
c for expositional 
clarity. In principle r
c and D might affect the intensive margin of borrowing, but in practice adding these 
interest rates to our loan size demand specifications does not change the results. Mechanically what 
happened was that very few clients changed their loan amounts after learning that r
c < r. 
9 
clients in the past but had never offered discounted interest rates or systematically experimented 
with creative content. 
 
i. Basic Content  
Each mailer contained some boilerplate content; e.g., the Lender’s logo, its slogan “the trusted 
way to borrow cash”, instructions for how to apply, and branch hours. Other pieces of boilerplate 
content are closely related to specific creative treatments and described below. 
 
ii.  Creative Treatments: Content, Motivation, and Priors 
Each mailer also contained mail merge fields that were populated (or could be left blank in some 
cases) with randomized variations on eight different creative features. Some randomizations were 
conditional on pre-approved characteristics and each of these conditions is included in the 
empirical models we estimate. 
The content and variations for each of the creative features are summarized in Table 2. We 
detail the features below along with the prior work and hypotheses underlying these treatments. 
Our motivation stems primarily from the psychology literature related to persuasive 
communication. We discuss alternative interpretations of creative content effects in Section IV.  
 
Feature 1: Photo.  As the example mailers show, 80% of the mailers featured a photo of a 
smiling person in the bottom right-hand corner. There was one photo subject for each 
combination of gender and race represented in our sample (for a total of 8 different photos in 
all).
18 All subjects were deemed attractive and professional-looking by the marketing firm. The 
overall target frequency for each photo was determined by the racial and gender composition of 
the sample and the objective of obtaining: a 2-to-1 ratio of photo race that matched the client’s 
race, a 1-1 ratio of photo gender that matches the client’s gender.
19 
The motivation for experimenting with photos starts with casual empiricism noting the 
prevalence of attractive females in ads. A large psychology literature on affective (as opposed to 
deliberative) decision making provides an indirect explanation for this stylized fact. Affective and 
                                                 
18 For mailers with a photo, the employee named at the bottom of the mailer was that of an actual employee 
of the same race and gender featured in the photo. In cases where no employee in the client’s branch had 
the matched race and gender, an employee from the regional office was listed instead. 
19 If the client was assigned randomly to "match," then the race of the client matched that of the model on 
the photograph. For those assigned to mismatch, we randomly selected one of the other races.  In order to 
determine a client's race, we used the race most commonly associated with his/her last name (as determined 
by employees of the Lender). The gender of the photo was then randomized unconditionally at the 
individual level. 
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often sub-conscious responses to stimuli drive decisions in many contexts; see, e.g., Slovic et al 
(2002) for a review. The most closely related study shows that randomly manipulated background 
images affect hypothetical student choices in a simulated Internet shopping environment (Mandel 
and Johnson 2002). 
Consequently our priors were: showing a photo of an attractive person would (weakly) 
increase take-up vs. no photo, and showing a female photo would (weakly) increase take-up vs. a 
male photo (Landry, Lange, List, Price and Rupp 2006). 
The motivation for experimenting with matched and mismatched photos comes from the 
psychology literature on communication and persuasion. Several studies suggest that 
demographic similarity between client and salesperson can drive choice (Evans 1963), and that 
similarity can outweigh expertise or credibility (Lord 1997; Cialdini 2001; Mobius and Rosenblat 
2006). 
Consequently we predicted that photos matched on race or gender would have (weakly) more 
positive effects on takeup than photos that were mismatched.    
 
Feature 2: Language Affinity 
For another “similarity” treatment, we inserted a blurb “We speak (client’s language)” for a 
random subset of the clients who were not primarily English speakers (44% of the sample).  
When present, the matched language blurb was directly under the “business hours” box in the 
upper right of the mailer. The rest of the mailer was always in English.
 
As with the matched photos we predicted that mentioning this type of similarity would 
(weakly) increase take-up. The Lender was particularly confident that this treatment would 
increase take-up and insisted that most eligible clients get it, hence the 63-37 split noted in Table 
2.   
 
Feature 3: “Special” rate vs. “Low” rate vs. no blurb  
As discussed above, nearly all of the interest rate offers were at discounted rates, and the Lender 
had never offered anything other than its standard rates prior to the experiment. So the Lender 
decided to highlight the unusual nature of the promotion for a random subset of the clients: 50% 
of clients received the blurb: “A special rate for you”, and 25% of clients received “A low rate for 
you”. The mail merge field was left blank for the remaining clients. When present the blurb was 
inserted just below the field for the language match. 
11 
Our prior was that this treatment would not influence take-up, although there may be models 
with very boundedly rational consumers and credible signaling by firms where showing one of 
these blurbs would (weakly) increase take-up. 
 
Feature 4: Suggested Uses 
After the salutation and deadline, the mailer said something about how the client could use the 
loan. This “suggested use” appeared in boldface type and took one of five variations on: "You can 
use this loan to X, or for anything else you want".  X was one of four common uses for cash loans 
indicated by market research and detailed in Table 2. The most general phrase simply stated: 
"You can use this cash for anything you want." Each of the five variations was randomly assigned 
with equal probabilities. 
A priori we thought the impact of this treatment was ambiguous. On one hand, suggesting 
particular uses might make consumption salient and serve as a cue to take-up the loan. On the 
other hand suggesting a particular use might create dissonance with the Lender’s “no questions 
asked” policy regarding loan uses, a policy designed to counteract stigma associated with high-
interest borrowing. Note that it is unlikely that suggesting a particular use provided information 
by (incorrectly) signaling a policy change regarding loan uses, since each variation ended with: 
“or for anything else you want.” 
 
Feature 5: Number of Example Loans 
The middle of a mailer prominently featured a table that was randomly assigned to display one or 
four example loans. Each example showed a loan amount and maturity based on the client’s most 
recent loan, and a monthly payment based on the randomly assigned interest rate.
20 The rate itself 
was also displayed in randomly chosen mailers (see Feature 6). Every mailer stated “Loans 
available in other amounts….” directly below the example(s) table. 
Our motivation for experimenting with a small vs. large table of loans comes from 
psychology and marketing papers on “choice overload.” In strict neoclassical models demand is 
(weakly) increasing in the number of choices. In contrast the choice overload literature has found 
that demand can decrease with menu size. Large menus can “demotivate” choice by creating 
feelings of conflict and indecision that lead to procrastination or total inaction (Shafir, Simonson 
and Tversky 1993). Overload effects have been found in field settings including physician 
                                                 
20 High risk clients were not eligible for 6- or 12-month loans and hence their 4-example table featured 4 
loan amounts based on small increments above the client’s last loan amount. When the client was eligible 
for longer maturities we randomly assigned whether the 4-example table featured different maturities. See 
Table 2 and Karlan and Zinman (forthcoming) for additional details. 
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prescriptions (Redelmeier and Shafir 1995) and 401k plans (Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang 2004). 
An influential field experiment shows that grocery store shoppers who stopped to taste jam were 
much more likely to purchase if there were 6 choices rather than 24 (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). 
We sought to test for choice overload in our setting by ensuring that each table contained an 
example loan based on the randomly assigned interest rate and the client’s most recent maturity 
and loan amount obtained from the Lender; i.e., the example loan presented in our small-table 
condition was nested in the larger-table condition. So under most models of consumer choice the 
small table provides less information than the larger table, and finding that mailers with a small 
table have higher take-up rates is evidence of a choice overload effect. We discuss an alternative 
interpretation based on signaling in Section IV. 
 
Feature 6: Interest Rate Shown in Example(s)? 
Tables also randomly varied whether the interest rate was shown.
21 In cases where the interest 
rate was suppressed the information presented in the table (loan amount, maturity, and monthly 
payment) was sufficient for the client to impute the rate. This point was emphasized with the 
statement below the table that: “There are no hidden costs. What you see is what you pay.” 
Displaying the interest rate has ambiguous effects on demand in rich models of consumer 
choice. Displaying the rate may depress demand by overloading bounded rational consumers (see 
Feature 5), or by de-biasing consumers who tend to underestimate rates when inferring them from 
other loan terms (Stango and Zinman 2007). Displaying the rate may have no effect if consumers 
do not understand interest rates and use decision rules based on other loan terms (this was the 
Lender’s prior). Finally, displaying the rate may induce demand by signaling that the Lender 
indeed has “no hidden costs”, and/or by reducing computational burden. 
Given the Lender’s prior that interest rate disclosure would not affect demand, and its 
branding strategy as a “trusted” source for cash, it decided to err on the side of full disclosure and 
the mailers displayed the interest rate with 80% probability. Given the Lender’s prior and the 
potential for offsetting effects, our prior was that disclosure would have no effect on consumer 
choice in this setting. 
 
Feature 7: Comparison to Outside Rate 
Randomly chosen mailers included a comparison of the offered interest rate to a higher outside 
market rate. When included the comparison appeared in boldface in the field below “Loans 
available in other amounts….” Half of the comparisons used a “gain frame”; e.g., "If you borrow 
                                                 
21 South African law did not require interest rate disclosure, in contrast to the U.S. Truth-in-Lending Act. 
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from us, you will pay R100 Rand less each month on a four month loan." Half of the comparisons 
used a “loss frame”; e.g., "If you borrow elsewhere, you will pay R100 Rand more each month on 
a four month loan."
22 
    Several papers have found that such frames can influence choice by manipulating “reference 
points” that enter decision rules or preferences. There is some evidence that the presence of a 
dominated alternative can induce choice of the dominating option (Huber, Payne and Puto 1982; 
Doyle, O'Connor, Reynolds and Bottomley 1999). This suggests that mailers with our dominated 
comparison rate should produce (weakly) higher take-up rates than mailers without mention of a 
competitor’s rate. Invoking potential losses may be a particularly powerful stimulus for demand if 
it triggers loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), and indeed 
Ganzach and Karsahi (1995) find that a loss-framed message induced significantly higher credit 
card usage than a gain-framed message in an direct marketing field experiment in Israel. This 
suggests the loss-framed comparison should produce (weakly) higher take-up rates than either the 
gain-frame or the no comparison conditions. 
 
Feature 8: Cell Phone Raffle 
Many firms, including the Lender and many of its competitors, use promotional giveaways as part 
of their marketing. Our experiment randomized whether a cell phone raffle was prominently 
featured in the bottom right margin of the mailer: "WIN 10 CELLPHONES UP FOR GRABS 
EACH MONTH!" Per common practice in the cash loan market, the mailers did not detail the 
odds of winning or the value of the prizes. 
In fact the expected value of the raffle for any individual client was vanishingly small.
23 
Given that the cash loan market was imperfectly competitive (see Section II, and the modest 
response to price reductions in Section V-A) this implies that the raffle should not change the 
take-up decision based on strictly economic factors.
24  
                                                 
22 The mailers also randomized the unit of comparison (Rand per month, Rand per loan, percentage point 
differential per month, percentage point differential per loan), but the resulting cell sizes are too small to 
statistically distinguish any differential effects of units on demand. 
23 The 10 cell phones were each purchased for R300 and randomly assigned within the pool of 
approximately 10,000 individuals who applied at the Lender’s branches during the 3 months spanned by 
the experiment. The pool was much larger than the number of applicants who received a mailer featuring 
the raffle, since by law all applicants (including first-time applicants, and former clients excluded from our 
sample frame) were eligible for the raffle. 
24 Omitting the raffle variable from our tests of the joint effect of the creative content variables has 
negligible impacts on the F-statistics reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
14 
Yet marketing practice suggests that promotional raffles may increase demand despite not 
providing any material increase in the expected value of taking up the offer. A possible channel is 
a tendency for individuals to over-estimate the frequency of small probability events,  
In contrast several other papers have reached the surprising conclusion that promotional 
giveaways can backfire and reduce demand. The channel seems to be that many consumers feel 
the need to justify their choices and find it more difficult to do so when the core product comes 
with an added option they do not value. This holds even when subjects understand that the added 
option comes at no extra pecuniary or time cost (Simonson, Carmon and O'Curry 1994). And 
there is no evidence that giveaways lead to inferences about the quality of the core product 
(Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993). 
Given the conflicting prior evidence we had no strong prior on whether and how promoting 
the cell phone raffle would affect demand. 
     
G. Deadlines 
As noted above each mailer also contained a randomly assigned deadline by which the client had 
to respond in order to obtain the offered interest rate. Deadlines ranged from “short” 
(approximately 2 weeks) to “long” (approximately 6 weeks). Short deadlines were assigned only 
among clients who lived in urban areas with a non-PO Box mailing address and hence were likely 
to receive their mail quickly (see Table 2 for details). Some clients eligible for the short deadline 
were randomly assigned a blurb showing a phone number to call for an extension (to the medium 
deadline). 
The deadline was randomized in order to create a somewhat low-powered test of 
procrastination (or time management problems more generally). As discussed above regarding 
choice overload, consumers may postpone difficult decisions or tasks. Indeed introspection and 
the findings in Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) suggest that individuals often choose to impose 
shorter deadlines on themselves even when longer ones are in the choice set. In contrast standard 
models predict that consumers will always (weakly) prefer the longest available deadline, due to 
the option value of waiting. 
Thus a priori the impact of shorter deadlines on takeup seemed ambiguous. 
 
IV. Conceptual Framework: Interpreting the Effects of Advertising Content 
As discussed above the creative content treatments in our experiment were motivated primarily 
by findings from psychology and marketing that are most closely related to persuasive theories of 
advertising. Here we formalize definitions of persuasion and other mechanisms through which 
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advertising content might affect consumer choice. We also speculate on the likely relevance of 
these different mechanisms in our research context. 
As a starting point consider a simple decision rule where consumers purchase a product if and 
only if the marginal cost of the product is less than the expected marginal return (in utility terms)  
of consuming the product.  A very simple way to formalize this is to note that the consumer 
purchases (loan) product (or consumption bundle) l iff: 
(2)  ui(l) – pi > 0  
Where ui is the consumer’s (discounted) utility gain from purchasing l and p is the price.
25  
Advertising has no effect on either u or p and the model predicts that we will not reject the 
hypothesis of null effects of creative content on demand when estimating equation (1). 
One might wonder whether a very slightly enriched model would predict that consumers who 
are just indifferent about borrowing (from the Lender) might be influenced by advertising content 
(say by changing the decision rule from randomizing, to “go with the choice that has the 
attractive mailer”.) This would be a more plausible interpretation in our setting if the 
experiment’s pricing were more uniform and standard, given that everyone in the sample had 
borrowed recently at the Lender’s standard rates. But experimental prices ranged widely, with a 
density almost entirely below the standard rates. Thus if consumers were indifferent on average in 
our sample then price reductions should have huge positive effects on take-up on average. This is 
not the case; Section V-A shows that take-up elasticities for the price reductions are substantially 
below one in absolute value.  
Models in the “behavioral” decision making and economics of advertising literatures enrich 
the simple decision rule in equation (2) and allow for the possibility that advertising affects 
consumer behavior; i.e., for the possibility that average effect on the creative content variables in 
equation (1) is different from 0. Following Bagwell’s (2007) taxonomy, we explore three distinct 
mechanisms. 
One possible mechanism is informative advertising content. Here the consumer has some 
uncertainty about the utility gain and/or price (that could be resolved by a consumer at a search 
and/or computational cost), and advertising operates on expectations about utility and price.  Now 




p(Cit)t[pi] > 0  
                                                 
25 In our context p is a summary statistic capturing the cost of borrowing. Without liquidity constraints the  
discounted sum of any fees + the periodic interest rate captures this cost. Under liquidity constraints loan 
maturity affects the effective price as well (Karlan and Zinman forthcoming). 
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Where expectations E at time t are influenced by the vector of advertising content C that 
consumer i receives. 
In our setting, for example, announcing that the firm speaks Zulu might provide information. 
The content treatments might also affect expected utility through credible signaling. Seeing a 
photo on the mailer might increase the client’s expectation of an enjoyable encounter with an 
attractive loan officer at the Lender’s branch. 
Our experimental design does not formally rule out these sorts of informative effects, but we 
do not find them especially plausible in this particular implementation. Recall that the mailers 
were sent exclusively to clients who successfully repaid prior loans from the Lender. Most had 
been to a branch within the past year and hence were familiar with the loan product, the 
transaction process, the branch’s staff and general environment, and the fact that loan uses are 
unrestricted. 
A second  possibility is that advertising is complementary to consumption: consumers have 
fixed preferences, and advertising makes the consumer “believe—correctly or incorrectly—that it 
[sic] gets a greater output of the commodity from a given input of the advertised product” (Stigler 
and Becker 1977). In reduced form, this means that advertising affects net utility by interacting 
with enjoyment of the product. So the consumer purchases if: 
(4)  ui(l, l*Ci) – pi > 0 
Our design does not formally rule out complementary mechanisms, but their relevance might 
be limited in our particular implementation. Complementary models tend to be motivated by 
luxury or prestige goods (e.g., cool advertising content makes me enjoy wearing a Rolex more, all 
else equal), and the product here is an intermediate good that is used most commonly to pay for 
necessities. Moreover, the first-hand prior experience our sample frame had with consumer 
borrowing makes it unlikely that marketing content would change perceptions of the loan product 
in a complementary way. 
Finally, a third mechanism is persuasive advertising content. A simple model of persuasion 
would be that the true utility of purchase is given by: ui(l) – pi . But individuals decide to 
purchase or not based on:  
(5) Di(ui(l), Ci) – pi >0 
where Di(ui(l), Ci) is the effective decision, rather than hedonic, utility. Persuasion can operate 
directly on preferences by manipulating reference points, providing cues that increase the 
marginal utility of consumption, providing motivation to make (rather than procrastinate) choices, 
or simplifying the complexity of decision making. Other channels for persuasion arise if 
perceptions of key decision parameters are biased and can be manipulated by advertising content. 
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To clarify the distinction from the informative view, note that allowing for biased expectations or 
biased perceptions of choice parameters is equivalent to allowing for a distinction between 
hedonic utility (i.e., true, experienced utility) and choice utility (perceived/expected utility at the 
time of the decision). Under a persuasive view of advertising, consumers decide based on choice 
utility.  
Notice that as in the traditional model, price will continue to affect overall demand. In this 
sense, there may appear to be a stable demand curve. But the demand curve may shift as content 
Ci varies. Thus demand estimation that ignores persuasive content may produce a misleading 
view of underlying utility.  
 
V. Results 
This section presents results from estimating the equation (1) detailed in Section III-B. 
 
A. Interest Rates 
Recall that consumer sensitivity to the price of the loan offer will provide a useful way to scale 
the magnitude of any advertising content effects. Table 3 shows the estimated magnitude of loan 
demand price sensitivities in our sample. 
Our main result on price is that the probability of applying rose 3/10 of a percentage point for 
every 100 basis point reduction in the monthly interest rate (Column 1). This implies a 4% 
increase in take-up for every 13% decrease in the interest rate, and a take-up price elasticity of -
0.28.
26 Column 2 shows a nearly identical result when the outcome is obtaining a loan instead of 
applying for a loan. Column 3 shows that the total loan amount borrowed (unconditional on 
borrowing) also responded negatively to price. The implied elasticity here is -0.34.
27 Column 4 
shows that default rose relatively strongly with price; this result indicates adverse selection and/or 
moral hazard with respect to interest rates.
28 Column 5 shows that more expensive offers did not 
induce significantly more substitution to other formal sector lenders (as measured from credit 
bureau data). This result is a precisely estimated zero relative to a sample mean outside borrowing 
proportion of 0.22. The lack of substitution is consistent with the descriptive evidence discussed 
in Section II on the dearth of close substitutes for the Lender. 
 
                                                 
26 Clients were far more elastic with respect to offers at rates greater than the Lender’s standard ones 
(Karlan and Zinman forthcoming). This small sub-sample (632 offers) is excluded here because it was part 
of a pilot wave of mailers that did not include the content randomizations. 
27 See Karlan and Zinman (forthcoming) for additional results on price sensitivity on the intensive margin. 
28 The finding here is reduced-form evidence of information asymmetries; see Karlan and Zinman (2007) 
for additional results that separately identify adverse selection and moral hazard effects. 
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B. Advertising Content Treatments 
Table 3 also presents the results on creative content variations for the full sample. 
The F-tests reported near the bottom of the table indicate whether the content features had an 
effect on demand that was jointly significantly different from zero.
29 The applied (or “take-up”) 
model has a p-value of 0.07, and the “obtained a loan” model has a p-value of 0.04, implying that 
advertising content did influence the extensive margin of loan demand with at least 90% 
confidence. Column 3 shows that the joint effect of content on loan amount is insignificant (p-
value = 0.25). Column 4 shows an insignificant effect on default; i.e., we do not find evidence of 
adverse selection on response to content. Column 5 shows an insignificant effect on outside 
borrowing; i.e., the positive effect on demand for credit from the Lender in Columns 1 and 2 does 
not appear to be driven by balance-shifting from other lenders. 
Results on the individual content feature variable conditions provide some insight into how 
much creative affects demand. For our preferred outcome (applied), the female photo, 1 example 
table, and “no specific loan use mentioned” conditions have statistically significant effects. In 
each case the implied magnitudes are large; each condition increases demand by at least as much 
as a 200 basis point (25%) reduction in the interest rate. Note that some caution regarding 
statistical inference is warranted here, since with 13 content variables we would expect one to be 
significant purely by chance.  The other notable finding here is the disjoint between our priors 
and actual findings. Several treatments that we thought might have significant effects did not (cell 
raffle, comparisons, client’s language, and no photo), and one condition we did not have strong 
priors about (no suggested use) turned out to have a strong positive effect. 
Another approach to estimating the magnitude of the advertising content effects is to identify 
the lower and upper bounds for the range of values for which the F-test does not fail for all 
creative content. The lower bound tells us the lowest absolute value for all creative coefficients 
for which the F-test rejects the null hypothesis. For applied as an outcome, this is 0.0010, and for 
take-up as an outcome, this is 0.0026. As with the point estimates on individual content variables, 
these bounds can be scaled by the price coefficient to obtain estimates of the relative magnitude 
of advertising content on loan demand. Thus, the lower bound “aggregate” content effect is one 
third of the effect generated by a one percentage point change in the monthly interest rate. The 
upper bounds, on the other hand, are very large, at 0.0448 and 0.0498, respectively. We only 
calculate upper and lower bounds when the primary null hypothesis of no effect is rejected (and 
hence we do not calculate bounds for content effects on loan size, outside borrowing, or default).  
                                                 
29 Results are nearly identical if we omit the raffle from the joint test of content effects on the grounds that 




Given our lack of strong priors on how any advertising content effects might vary with consumer 
characteristics, and statistical power issues, we will not devote much space to discussing 
heterogeneity in responses to advertising content. 
For the interested reader, Table 4 presents results for sub-samples split by gender, education 
(as predicted from occupation), number of prior loans with the Lender, and number of months 
since prior loan with the Lender. There is some evidence that males respond more to creative 
content (Columns 1 and 2). But we view these results as merely suggestive. 
 
D. Deadlines 
Recall that the mailers also included randomly assigned deadlines designed to test the relative 
importance of option value (longer deadlines make the offer more valuable and induce take-up) 
versus time management problems (longer deadlines induce procrastination and perhaps 
forgetting, and depress takeup). Table 5 presents results from estimating our usual specification 
with the deadline variables included.
30 
The results in Table 5 Panel A suggest that option value dominates any time management 
problem in our context: take-up increased dramatically with deadline length. Lengthening the 
deadline by approximately two weeks (i.e., moving from the omitted short deadline to the 
extension option or medium deadline, or from medium to long) increases take-up by about three 
percentage points. This is a large effect relative to the mean take-up rate of 0.085, and enormous 
relative to the price effect. Shifting the deadline by two weeks had about the same effect as a 
1,000 basis point reduction in the interest rate. This large effect could be due to time-varying 
costs of getting to the branch (e.g., transportation cost, opportunity cost of missing work), and/or 
to borrowing opportunities or needs that vary stochastically (e.g., bad shocks). 
Some caveats are in order however. First, the strength of the longer-deadline effect may be 
due in part to the nature of direct mail. We took precautions to ensure that the mailers arrived 
well before the assigned deadline, but it may be the case that clients did not open the mailer until 
after the deadline expired. E.g., if clients only opened their mail every two weeks, then the short 
deadline would mechanically produce a very low takeup rate (in fact the mean rate for those 
offered the short deadline was 0.057, vs. 0.085 for the full sample). Second, our deadline 
                                                 
30 We omit the creative content variables from the specification for expositional clarify in the table, but 
recall that all randomizations were done independently. So including the full set of treatments does not 
change the results. 
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variation may miss important nonlinearities over longer horizons. Note however that longer 
deadlines were arguably empirically irrelevant in our context, as the Lender deemed deadlines 
beyond six weeks operationally impractical. 
Panel B explores whether Panel A misses a smaller, offsetting procrastination effect. We do 
this by testing whether shorter deadlines increase the likelihood of take-up after deadlines pass. 
There is no support for this hypothesis. 
In all the results suggest that deadlines may be very important determinants of consumer 
choice and merit continued study. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Theories of advertising, and laboratory studies on framing, cues, and product presentation, 
suggest that advertising content can have important effect on consumer choice. Yet there is 
remarkably little field evidence on how much, and what types, of advertising “creative” content 
affect demand. We analyze a direct mail field experiment that simultaneously and independently 
randomized the price and creative content of actual loan offers made to former clients of a 
subprime consumer lender in South Africa. We find that advertising content had statistically 
significant effects on take-up. There is some evidence that these content effects were 
economically large relative to price effects. Consumer response to advertising content does not 
seem to have been driven by substitution across lenders, and there is no evidence that it produced 
adverse selection. Deadline length trumped both creative content and price in economic 
importance. In all, the results suggest that advertising content and deadlines are important drivers 
of consumer choice. Our design and results also leave many questions unanswered and suggest 
directions for future research. 
First, we found it difficult to predict ex-ante which types and variations of creative content 
would affect demand. This fits with a central premise of psychology—context matters— and 
suggests that pinning down the types and magnitude of content effects will require systematic 
field experimentation on a broad scale. Also, studying the dynamics of consumer responses will 
be particularly important given the opportunities for learning from repeated exposures to 
advertising. 
Another unresolved question is why creative content matters. In the taxonomy of the 
economics of advertising literature, the question is whether content is informative, 
complementary to preferences, and/or persuasive. We find the persuasive mechanism most 
compelling in our context, given the nature of the product (an intermediate good) and the 
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experience level of consumers in the sample. But this interpretation is speculative, since our 
design is not sufficiently rich to identify mechanisms underlying the content effects.  
 Lastly, it will be fruitful to study consumer choice in conjunction with the strategies of firms 
that provide and frame choice sets. A literature on industrial organization with “behavioral” or 
“boundedly rational” consumers is just beginning to (re-)emerge (Ellison 2006; Gabaix and 
Laibson 2006), and there should be gains from trade between this literature and related ones on 
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29Full sample Obtained a loan Did Not Obtain a Loan
Applied before deadline 0.085 1 0.01
Obtained a loan before deadline 0.074 1 0
Loan amount in Rand 110 1489 0
(536) (1351) (0)
Loan in default 0.12
Got outside loan and did not apply with Lender 0.22 0.00 0.24
Maturity = 4 months 0.81
Offer rate 7.93 7.23 7.98
Last loan amount in Rand 1118 1158 1115
(829) (835) (828)
Last maturity = 4 months 0.93 0.91 0.93
Low risk 0.14 0.30 0.12
Medium risk 0.10 0.21 0.10
High risk 0.76 0.50 0.78
Female 0.48 0.49 0.48
Predicted education (years) 6.85 7.08 6.83
(3.25) (3.30) (3.25)
Number previous loans with Lender 4.14 4.71 4.10
(3.77) (4.09) (3.74)
Months since most recent loan with Lender 10.4 6.19 10.8
(6.80) (5.81) (6.76)
Race = African 0.85 0.85 0.85
Race = Indian 0.03 0.03 0.03
Race = White 0.08 0.08 0.08
Race = Mixed ("Coloured") 0.03 0.04 0.03
Gross monthly income in Rand 3416 3424 3416
(19657) (2134) (20420)
Number of observations 53194 3944 49250
Means or proportions, with standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
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Photo with race matched to client race 0.53
Photo with mismatched race 0.27
Female photo 0.40
Male photo 0.40
Photo with gender matched to client gender 0.40
Photo with mismatched gender 0.40
Feature 2: Client's Language "We speak [client's language]" 0.63 Eligible if non-English primary language (0.44 of full sample)
No mention of language 0.37
Feature 3: "A 'special' or 'low' rate for you" Interest rate is labeled as: All
"Special" or "Low" 0.75
No mention of "Special" or "Low" 0.25
Feature 4: Suggested Loan Uses "You can use this loan for anything you want" 0.20 All
"You can use this loan to X, or for anything else you want", where X is:
Pay off a more expensive debt 0.20
Buy an appliance 0.20
Pay for school 0.20
Repair your home 0.20
Feature 5: Number of Example Loans One loan amount shown in example table 0.43 All
    Of low and medium risk clients 0.15
    Of high risk clients 0.52
Four loan amounts shown in example table 0.57
    Four loan amounts in table, one maturity (high risk clients) 0.48
    Four loan amounts in table, one maturity (low/med risk clients) 0.75
    Four loan amounts in table, three maturities (low/med risk clients) 0.10 Only low and medium risk eligible for 4 amount, 3 maturity treatment
Feature 6: Interest Rate Shown in Example(s)? Interest rate shown (and monthly payments) 0.80 All
Interest rate not shown (just monthly payments) 0.20
Feature 7: Comparison to Outside Rate No comparison to competitor rates 0.20 All
Gain frame 0.40
Loss frame 0.40
Feature 8: Cell Phone Raffle Mentioned cell phone raffle 0.25 All
Not mentioned cell phone raffle 0.75
Other Treatments
Interest Rate High Risk: [3.25, 11.75]
Medium Risk: [3.25, 9.75]
Low Risk: [3.25, 7.75]
Deadline Medium deadline (approx 4 weeks) 0.78 1.0 of sample eligible for medium
Long deadline (approx 6 weeks) 0.14 0.79 of sample eligible for long (certain branches excluded by Lender)
Short deadline (approx 2 weeks) 0.03 0.14 of sample eligible for short (certain branches excluded by Lender, and all PO Boxes excluded)
Short deadline with option to extend 2 weeks by calling in 0.04
Monthly rates randomly assigned from a smooth distribution, conditional on risk
Assigned conditional on client's race to produce the targeted ratio of client-photo matches.
Table 2. Experimental Summary
31LHS: Applied Obtained Loan Loan amount





Specification: Probit Probit OLS Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Offer interest rate -0.003*** -0.003*** -4.771*** 0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.824) (0.001) (0.001)
1= no photo 0.001 0.003 3.932 0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (7.676) (0.009) (0.006)
1= female photo 0.006** 0.006** 8.329 -0.011** -0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (5.090) (0.006) (0.004)
1= photo gender matches client’s -0.003 -0.003 -7.177 -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (5.085) (0.006) (0.004)
1= black photo 0.006 0.003 -3.762 0.013 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (10.628) (0.010) (0.007)
1= photo race matches borrower’s -0.006 -0.003 9.064 -0.008 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (10.408) (0.009) (0.007)
1 = we speak (your language) -0.004 -0.004 -11.356* -0.001 0.013**
(0.004) (0.003) (6.293) (0.008) (0.006)
1 = a ‘low’ or 'special' rate for you 0.000 0.001 3.386 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (5.921) (0.007) (0.005)
1 = no specific loan use mentioned 0.006** 0.004 4.085 0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (5.627) (0.007) (0.004)
1 = one example loan 0.007** 0.008*** 2.439 -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (4.838) (0.006) (0.004)
1 = interest rate shown 0.002 0.004 2.888 -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (6.723) (0.007) (0.005)
1= no comparison to competitor rate 0.003 0.001 -0.490 -0.006 -0.008*
(0.003) (0.003) (6.460) (0.007) (0.005)
1= gain frame comparison to competitor rate 0.002 0.002 -3.092 0.010 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (5.068) (0.006) (0.004)
1 = cell phone raffle mentioned -0.002 -0.001 -9.438* 0.010 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (5.120) (0.007) (0.004)
(pseudo-) R-squared 0.0456 0.0534 0.0361 0.0626 0.0048
N 53194 53194 53194 3944 53194
p-value F-test on all advertising content variables 0.0729 0.0431 0.2483 0.2873 0.4866
Absolute value of lower bound of range for which F-test rejects null 0.0010 0.0026
Absolute value of upper bound of range for which F-test fails to reject null 0.0448 0.0498
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors. Probit results are marginal effects. All models include controls for randomization conditions:
risk, race, gender, language, and mailer wave (September or October).
OLS, Probit
Table 3. Effects of Advertising Content on Borrower Behavior: Full Sample
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offer interest rate -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002***
(3.484) (4.361) (4.344) (3.554) (4.622) (3.051) (4.026) (3.839)
1= no photo 0.003 0.002 -0.006 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.008 -0.005
(0.590) (0.388) (0.912) (1.208) (0.037) (0.454) (1.189) (1.254)
1= female photo 0.008** 0.003 0.004 0.007** 0.004 0.007* 0.009** 0.002
(2.285) (0.829) (0.818) (2.183) (1.341) (1.755) (2.085) (0.712)
1= photo gender matches client’s -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004
(0.671) (0.562) (0.107) (1.633) (0.343) (1.373)
1= black photo -0.000 0.012* 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.014* 0.001 0.009*
(0.034) (1.727) (0.900) (0.624) (0.298) (1.646) (0.128) (1.836)
1= photo race matches borrower’s -0.001 -0.010 -0.013* -0.000 -0.001 -0.014 0.003 -0.013***
(0.211) (1.419) (1.804) (0.064) (0.267) (1.621) (0.436) (2.615)
1 = we speak (your language) -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004
(0.334) (1.357) (1.206) (0.554) (1.430) (0.029) (0.677) (0.981)
1 = a ‘low’ or 'special' rate for you -0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.003
(0.530) (0.598) (1.214) (1.093) (0.391) (0.472) (0.524) (0.924)
1 = no specific loan use mentioned 0.008** 0.003 0.004 0.007* 0.008** 0.003 0.010** 0.003
(2.146) (0.724) (0.931) (1.831) (2.151) (0.647) (2.059) (0.866)
1 = one example loan 0.010*** 0.003 0.006 0.007** 0.005 0.009* 0.010** 0.004
(2.662) (0.776) (1.245) (2.162) (1.629) (1.879) (2.176) (1.313)
1 = interest rate shown -0.002 0.007 -0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.404) (1.604) (0.074) (1.064) (0.291) (0.889) (0.164) (1.203)
1= no comparison to competitor rate 0.003 0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.718) (0.411) (1.449) (0.187) (0.984) (0.119) (0.355) (0.766)
1= gain frame comparison to competitor rate 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.525) (0.764) (1.026) (0.377) (0.916) (0.404) (0.307) (1.273)
1 = cell phone raffle mentioned -0.000 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(0.034) (1.247) (1.552) (0.147) (0.075) (1.210) (0.828) (0.181)
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.044 0.050 0.043 0.032 0.056 0.026 0.006
N 27848 25346 20809 32385 30766 22428 28264 24923
p-value F-test on all advertising content variables 0.0623 0.5354 0.3090 0.2002 0.2747 0.4512 0.2716 0.2327
Absolute value of lower bound of range for which F-test rejects null 0.0021
Absolute value of upper bound of range for which F-test fails to reject null 0.0388
Table 4. Effects of Advertising Content on Likelihood of Applying: Heterogeneity
Probit
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Probit marginal effects with Huber-White standard errors. All models include controls for randomization conditions: risk, race, gender (columns
3-8 only), language and mailer wave (September or October).












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Offer interest rate -0.003*** -0.003*** -4.777*** 0.008*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.824) (0.002) (0.001)
Short deadline, extended 0.032*** 0.024** 31.132* 0.024 -0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (17.286) (0.042) (0.013)
Medium deadline 0.030*** 0.027*** 38.034*** 0.021 -0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (13.823) (0.030) (0.012)
Long deadline 0.060*** 0.056*** 70.112*** 0.014 -0.005
(0.012) (0.011) (15.095) (0.036) (0.012)
Adjusted r-squared (or pseudo) 0.0461 0.0538 0.0351 0.0597 0.0007
F-test of joint significance of all deadlines 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8487 0.8813
N 53194 53194 53194 3944 53194










Offer interest rate -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Short deadline, extended -0.022* -0.005 -0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Medium deadline -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Long deadline -0.009 0.002 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Pseudo r-squared 0.0560 0.0448 0.0369
F-test of joint significance of all deadlines 0.2518 0.6332 0.8262
N 53194 53194 53194
Table 5.  Effects of Deadline on Borrower Behavior
Probit, OLS
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors. Probit results are marginal effects.  All models 
include controls for randomization conditions: risk, mailer wave (September or October), and deadline eligibility.
Short deadline is the omitted category; "short deadline, extended" gave customers a number to call and get an 
extension (to the medium deadline).
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